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PSYCHOLOGY, MENTAL ILLNESS, AND THE LAW*
LEE SILV

V.

M"E1N

°

ALCOHOLICS AND DRUG AI)icS

the foregoing discussion of commitment of the mentally ill
one special group was intentionally omitted-the inebriates. The
West Virginia statute defines an inebriate as "any person over the
age of eighteen years who is incapable or unfit to properly conduct
himself or herself, or his or her affairs, or is dangerous to himself or
herself or others, by reason of periodical, frequent or constant drunkenness, induced either by the use of alcoholic or other liquors, or of
opium, morphine, or other narcotic or intoxicating or stupefying
substance." 61 The statute goes on to provide for commitment of
inebriates upon the same basis as mentally ill persons with a
similar complaint and hearing before the mental hygiene commission. The statute does not make it clear whether inebriates are
regarded as mentally ill: the provision concerning inebriates is included in the chapter on mentally ill persons, but is placed in a
separate article on inebriates and criminal mentally ill. When an
inebriate is committed, it is for a minimum period of thirty days.
He is to be released ". . . when, in the opinion of the superintendent of the institution, he has received the maximum benefit from
such hospitalization." However the inebriate does not forfeit his
legal capacity, as does the mental patient who is committed for
62
an indeterminate period.
JN

In 1955 thirty-one persons charged with inebriation appeared
before the Kanawha County Mental Hygiene Commission, and
twenty-four of them were committed. Similar figures obtain for
earlier years. 68 From these statistics it may be roughly estimated
that 300 persons are charged with inebriation each year in West
Virginia and 225 committed. This is about 16 percent of the total
of persons committed for all causes. This estimate for West Virginia
is only a few percentage points higher than the national figure of
12 percent of all first admissions to mental hospitals. 64 The great
defect in the method of dealing with alcoholics in West Virginia,
The first part of this article appeared at 60 W. VA. L. REv. 55 (1957).
*0Member of the Kanawha County Bar.
61W. VA. CODE c. 27, art. 6, § 1 (Michie 1955).
62 Ibid. Cf. art. 5, § 4. See text at note 45 supra.
63 For 1954 the figures were 28 and 21 respectively, and for 1953 they
84 and 27. These figures were gathered by the Kanawha Welfare Council.
were 64
*

GonmA, EvERY OTm BED 221.
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as in most other states, is that present techniques of treatment do
not effect a lasting cure. Fortunately there is evidence that new
drugs may help cure alcoholism and drug addiction as well as
65
mental illness.
The ambivalent legal approach to alcoholism-now a minor
crime, now a form of mental illness-reflects the changing public
attitude toward the problem. The old moralistic view was that
drunkenness was wicked and that the excessive drinker should be
punished. This attitude is slowly giving way to the more modem
view that the inebriate is usually a person who is emotionally disturbed, and in severe cases mentally ill.66 This modem, psychologically oriented view was adopted in West Virginia by the Legislative Interim Committee to Conduct Study of Alcoholism and
Alcoholic and Drug Addicts:
"Occasionally alcoholism appears to be directly related
to a psychotic or feebleminded condition. In many cases it is
obviously a reflection of less grave but still very severe personality disorders. Often the average person would see no
serious psychosocial maladjustment in the uncontrolled drinker
he knows and yet it is difficult to envisage the illness without
the existence of underlying problems in the inner life of the
individual and in his environment.
"It would seem safe to say that most alcoholics are dependent and impulsive people whose inadequate relationships
with people early in their lives made them especially vulnerable to tensions and pressures in later life. They are apt to be
basically lonely and egocentric and to have been deprived of
the rewarding experience of close relationships with those about
them. Feelings of unworthiness and anxiety may be masked
by a thin veneer of enforced gaiety, competitiveness, etc. This
veneer is deceptive to others and even to the individual, and
the struggle underneath may not become apparent until an
alcoholic pattern is well established. Even then, the underlying
problems and the alcoholism itself may be denied by the afflicted person (just as most of us may avoid recognizing personal inadequacies). "7
The committee estimated that there are 33,000 alcoholics in
West Virginia, of whom about five-sixths are men. The rate is about
65
66 Id. at 222-28.

Fox AND LYON, ALCOHOLISm-ITs SCOPE, CAusE AND TREATMENT
(1955); YAmAmS, ALCOHOLISM IS A SICxKss (1950); HAGGARD AND JELLINEC,
ALCOHOL
EXpLORED (1942).
67
ALcOHOLISM IN WEST VnnIA 18-14 (Report of Committee, 1954).
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29 alcoholics for each 1000 adults. About one-fourth of the alcoholics have developed physical or mental diseases or both as a result
of prolonged drinking. The committee submitted a questionnaire
about the problem of alcoholics to various interested groups in the
state. The great majority of those who responded felt that additional services or facilities were needed in the state for the prevention of alcoholism and the rehabilitation of alcoholics. It is signifi-cant that there are more arrests in the state for offenses involving
68
alcohol than for all other offenses combined.
The committee concluded that "The present use of our State
Mental Hospitals is generally unproductive as a treatment program
and should be regarded as a stop-gap measure." Hence the committee recommended that an independent commission on alcoholism
be established, with authority, among other things, to encourage
and coordinate services at the local community level, to carry on
a broad educational program, to work for prevention and early
treatment, and to establish a pilot outpatient clinic in a large center
of population, with a staff consisting of "a part-time psychiatrist, a
part-time internist, a full-time social caseworker, a full-time secretary receptionist, and a consulting psychologist who might be
69
employed on a fee basis."
Because of limited funds the legislature has not yet created
an independent commission on alcoholism. However in 1957 the
legislature did take a step in this direction by authorizing the new
department of mental health to establish a program for alcoholics.7 0
The statute closely follows the recommendations of the interim committee.
Fortunately for West Virginia there are very few drug addicts in
the state. This may be because most of the state is distant from
large cities and from the seacoast. The legislative interim committee concluded that drug addiction is not a problem in the state.
Now and then an addict appears before a mental hygiene commission and is committed to a mental hospital. 7 ' At the national
level there are two somewhat different approaches to the problem
of narcotics, corresponding to the two different attitudes toward
alcoholism. One approach is punitive, looking upon addiction as
6s Id., passim.
69 Id. at 43-44.
7oW. Va. Acts 1957, c. 107; W. VA. CoDE c. 27, art. 1, § 11 (Michie

Supp.711957.)
In Kanawha county there is about one case a year.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958

3

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
a crime. Taking this approach, Congress has greatly increased the
penalties for importation and sale of narcotics, especially sale to
juveniles. Under the terms of legislation enacted in 1956, a defendant who is guilty of selling heroin to persons under 18 years of age
is subject to a fine of as much as $20,000 and a prison sentence of
at least ten years and as much as life, except that the jury may direct
72
that the penalty be death.
This punitive approach has been strongly criticized by Dr. Herbert Berger, chairman of the Committee on Alcoholism and Narcotics of the New York State Medical Society.73 Dr. Berger is a
spokesman for the other attitude toward drug addiction, the attitude
that the addict is a sick person rather than a criminal. A different
part of the federal statute on narcotics evinces this attitude: treatment centers for drug addicts have been established at Lexington,
Ky., and Fort Worth, Tex. Persons guilty of addiction or other
prisoners who are found to be addicts may be sent there for treatment and rehabilitation. 74 The centers also accept voluntary patients, who of course do not forfeit their civil rights.75 A young
addict who is apprehended may be permitted to apply for voluntary
treatment, thus "keeping his record clean." Dr. Berger explains that
one reason for the punitive legislation is that the public erroneously
believes that narcotics incite the addict to violent crime, whereas
in reality narcotics are a sedative rather than a stimulant. The
typical addict is a person who is ". . . shy, uncompetitive, and
congenitally incapable of facing adversity. He is a procrastinator,
avoiding decisions and forever seeking to escape from his environment. While this is unnatural behavior, it is rather difficult to
criticize: one finds it so frequently among us all. He closely resembles the food addict and is blood brother to the alcoholic. His
abnormality is lessened and he approaches conformity while on
drugs... .,76 Without condoning drug addiction Berger points
out that our present laws deny to the addict any legal source of
drugs, thus forcing him to buy in the underworld at extremely
high prices. Profits are fabulous: an ounce of heroin purchased
for $5 in China has sold for as much as $8,000 in New York City.
571 (1956), 21 U.S.C. § 176b (Supp. IV, 1957).
Berger, To Dispel the Nightmare of Narcotics, N.Y. Times Mag., July 8,
1956, p. 12.
7458 STAT. 699 (1944), 42 U.S.C. § 259 (1952).
75 58 STAT. 701 (1944), as amended, 62 STAT. 1018 (1948), and 70 STAT.
622 (1956), 42 U.S.C. § 260 (Supp. IV, 1957).
76 Berger, supra note 73.
7270 STAT.
73
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In order to get enough funds to satisfy his daily need for drugs,
the addict often drifts into petty crime, such as bookmaking, running
numbers slips, pilfering, or prostitution. The worst harm the addict
does in society is introducing new persons to the habit, often juveniles,
so that the addict may earn sufficient commissions on sales to these
neophytes to assure his own daily supply. Thus our present punitive
law fails to eliminate addiction and at the same time it keeps alive
a flourishing illicit traffic in narcotics. To solve the narcotics problem Berger recommends establishment of more clinics on the federal
pattern, staffed by "nurses, pharmacists, psychiatrists, vocational
guidance experts, religious counselors, sociologists, psychologists,
and physicions" except that in areas where there are only a few
addicts, a single physician could carry out all these duties. 77 These
clinics should operate on the theory that the addict is a mentally sick
person who is to be rehabilitated without drugs if humanly possible,
but with them if nothing else can be done. Addicts should be
encouraged to submit to voluntary hospitalization or outpatient
treatment. This sort of approach to the problem has been successful in the United Kingdom. In that country there are only 279
known addicts, and the law permits them to be treated by physicians
who may write prescriptions for them for narcotics. Hence there is
no criminal system of illegal distribution and no proselytizing of
new addicts.
Thus with the problem of drug addiction, as with the problem
of alcoholism we see that efforts are being made to explain the
habit in terms of psychology and to look upon the habitue as a
sick person rather than as a criminal. Rehabilitation and not punishment is the modem approach.
VI.

CoiADmUET OF MENTALLY ILL GmMINALS;
THE PROBLEM OF SEX OFFENDERS

There is still another group of persons who are sent to the
mental hospitals-those who have perpetrated crimes. (In this section the verb "commit" is used only in the sense of "hospitalize".
Also the term "mentally ill criminal" is used to designate persons
who are committed by criminal courts and penal institutions, even
though strictly speaking such persons are not criminals because they
lack mens rea.) To be sure, some persons whose behavior violates
the criminal law are committed to mental institutions by the civil
77 Id. at 20.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1958

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 60, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
proceedings discussed above. Indeed, as a staff psychiatrist at the
Menninger Foundation has pointed out, "Some of our patients are
distinguishable from many of those on trial or in prisons only by
the fact that a charge has not been filed against them."78 In this
section we shall be concerned not with the lawbreakers who are
civilly committed, but with persons who are committed at a pretrial or post-conviction stage of a criminal proceeding.
Let us consider first those persons charged with crime who
prior to trial are found to be mentally ill. The West Virginia statute
provides: "If any person charged with or convicted of crime be
found, in the court before which he is charged or was convicted,
to be mentally ill, and if such court shall order him to be confined
in one of the state hospitals, he shall be received and confined in
it."79 Note that the determination of sanity is to be made by the
court in these cases, not by the mental hygiene commission as in
civil cases. In practice the court may decide this question by sending the defendant to a state mental hospital for examination and
report, by calling in a local psychiatrist, or even by referring the
question to a jury, as was done in the recent Linger case at Weston.
Obviously the first two methods place considerably greater reliance
on medical experts than does the third method. In other jurisdictions, as we shall see below, there are highly developed procedures
for pre-trial psychiatric examination. The writer recommends that
the West Virginia legislature study the present statute and consider
an amendment spelling out a specific and uniform procedure for
the trial courts to use in determining whether the defendant is
mentally ill. By contrast the parallel section for the mentally
defective criminal is quite specific, declaring that the court shall
appoint two physicians to examine the defendant and ascertain
whether he is mentally defective.8 0 As noted previously, the criminal who is found mentally ill must be held in jail while awaiting
transfer to the mental hospital, 8 ' whereas his fellow sufferer who
is up for civil commitment-and who may have behaved in exactly
the same way but not been arrested-is to be held in jail only
in an emergency or when no other facilities are available.8 2 Our
statute seems to be exactly backwards here-if the mentally ill per78

Satten, The Concept of Responsibility in Psychiatry, 4 Ktis. L. REv,
361, 365 (1956).
79 W. VA. CODE c. 27, art. 6, § 2 (Michie 1955).
80 d.art. 10, § 2(b).
81 Id. art. 6, § 2.
S2 Id. art. 5, § 5. See text at note 41 supra.
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son is so disordered that he has perpetrated a crime, that ought to
be more reason, not less, for keeping him in restraint in a hospital
or rest home rather than in jail. By contrast the mentally defective
criminal fares much better: the court is to designate a reputable
person "to convey such mentally defective person to the school and
to protect such person until such time as he or she can be conveyed
to the institution."83
A second group of mentally ill criminals consists of those who
have been convicted and sent to prison and who become ill during
a prison sentence (or whose pre-existing illness is then recognized
for the first time). The West Virginia statute, as amended in 1957,
provides that the warden of the prison shall send such a person to
a state mental institution for examination. 84 Presumably the term
"institution" includes the West Virginia training school for mental
defectives. This interpretation of the statute is appropriate when
it is read in pari materia with chapter 27 on mentally ill persons,
which includes an article on the training school and mental defectives. Thus the term "hospital" when used in the section on mentally
ill convicts would include the training school. At the hospital an
examining board observes the convict for a period of 30 days and
determines whether he is mentally diseased. If the decision is
negative, the convict is returned to prison. If positive, the board
sends a detailed report of its findings to the county court of the
convict's home county; thereupon the county court convenes the
mental hygiene commission to decide whether the convict should
be committed to the hospital. The commitment order is usually
granted, since the statute directs the mental hygiene commission
to give full faith and credit to the report of the examining board.
If the convict recovers mental health before his sentence expires,
he is returned to the prison with credit on his sentence for time
spent at the hospital. On the other hand if his sentence has expired,
he is simply discharged from the hospital.
It should be mentioned that in some states and in the federal
system the prisons have a psychiatrist and a psychologist on their
staff and may even have a psychiatric ward at the prison. 85 These
experts are helpful in providing guidance and counsel preliminary
to parole or discharge.
83Id. art. 10, § 2(b).

VA. CODE c. 28, art. 5, § 81 (Michie Supp. 1957).
5 See Bean, How a Federal Prison Prepares Its Prisoners for Return to
Society, 17 FED. PRoB. 38 (1958).
S4W.

8
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A third group of mentally ill criminals are those who go to
trial and are acquitted on the ground of insanity. (Note that "insanity" is a legal term implying a sharp and clear division between
the sane and the insane person. Psychiatrists deny that there is any
such clear division and prefer the term "mental illness" or "mental
disorder."86 This point will be further discussed below.) Defendants so acquitted, like those found mentally ill prior to trial, are
87
required to wait in jail until they can be committed to the hospital.
In the next section we shall consider the legal tests of insanity which
are used in criminal cases.
The problem of sex offenders may be viewed as a special phase
of the problem of mentally ill criminals. In 1957 the legislature of
West Virginia, following the example of some 20 other states, enacted
a special law applying to sex offenders. 88 Included are persons convicted of incest, crime against nature (unnatural sexual relations
with another person or with an animal), rape, obscenity, indecent
exposure, and appropriate cases of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor. If a person is convicted of any of these crimes, the court
may turn him over to the departinent of mental health for pre-sentence "social, physical, and mental examinations." 89 If the department "recommends specialized treatment for the person's mental
or physical aberrations", the court either (1) commits him to the
department for appropriate treatment at a mental hospital, or (2)
places him on probation with the condition that he receive appropriate outpatient treatment at a psychiatric clinic. 90 A person who
has been committed to the department may be recommended for
parole if it appears "that he is capable of making acceptable adjustment in society." 9 ' The department is given authority to petition the
court to order that the sex offender be confined for as long as five
years beyond the maximum sentence provided for the offense, and
92
to petition the committing court for confirmation of such an order.
A hearing is to be held on the petition, at which the defendant is
entitled to be present with counsel and expert witnesses; jury trial,
S See BIcos, Tm GuirTY Mm 139-42 (1955), quoting an interesting
cross-examination of a psychiatrist that illustrates the difficulty of making sharp

distinctions. See also OvMusOLsx,

TBE PsYcmATUsT AND THE LAw 45.

.87W.
VA. CODE C.27, art. 6, § 2 (Michie 1955). See text at note 81 supra.
88r.

Va. Acts 1957, c. 48; W. VA. CODE c. 27, art. 6A (Michie Supp.

1957).
89W. VA. CODE c. 27, art. 6A, §§ 1, 19 (Michie Supp. 1957).
90 Id. § 6.
91 Id. § 10.
92 Id. §§ 12-13, 15.
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however, is not permitted. 93 The court is to appoint counsel for
indigent defendants. (It would seem that counsel should be paid
counsel, in accord with the defender statute,94 since indefinite
commitment is as serious a deprivation of liberty as incarceration.)
The department of mental health is required to review all cases
of commitment at least once each year. It is possible, however, that
a sex offender could be confined for life, by a series of orders for
continuing commitment obtained every five years by the department
of mental health.
There are several noteworthy things about this new statute.
First it recognizes that of the whole mass of sex offenders, some
should be accorded psychiatric treatment in preference to incarceration or ordinary probation. Here we have a new departure in
penology in this state. This leads to the next point-that the statute
seems to assume that sex offenders are more likely to be suffering
from mental disorder than are criminals as a whole. It may well
be asked whether persons who violate the sexual mores of society
are any more likely to be mentally ill than those who violate the
general mores. The answer lies perhaps in the nature of sex crimes,
which are often irrational and queer, thereby suggesting mental
illness. (In some states "sexual psychopath" laws have been enacted
in an emotional atmosphere because of the shocking or disgusting
nature of sex offenses, 95 but this did not occur in West Virginia.)
Some states have applied the principles of mental examination of
criminals and of indeterminate sentence to much broader classes
of criminals, as we shall see below. In evaluating the West Virginia
statute one should bear in mind that sex criminals are not a distinct
group, but a heterogeneous collection of various kinds of personalities, since many different kinds of mental disorders can cause sexual
deviations. 96 For instance, the 60-year old man who is charged
with contributing to the delinquency of a small girl may be a
psychotic suffering from senile arteriosclerosis. Exhibitionism or
indecent exposure is often the result of a compulsive neurosis
deriving from early childhood relationships. And there are at least
three kinds of persons who commit rape: the homosexual who overcompensates, the sadistic person, and the generally aggressive per93 Id.

§ 14.

94W. VA. CODE c. 62, art. 8, § 1 (Michie 1955).
95 OvERnoLsmR, THE PSYCMATIUST AND THE LAw 48-50.
96
GurmAcnA
AND WEIHOFEN, PSYCMTiY AND TmE LAw 118 ff.; East,
Sexual Offenders, in MENTrL ABNORMALrrY AN Cman
177. See also KATz
AND THoRPE, UNDMSTANDING PEOPLE IN Drsrimss c. 6-7 (1955).
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son who also commits other crimes such as burglary. 97 Thus the
new statute is fallacious if it assumes that sex offenders are a similar,
homogeneous group. Also the psychiatrists affirm that many crimes
other than sex offenses may have a sexual element or may be
explained in terms of the basic sex drive. Despite these caveats
about the new statute it should be regarded as a progressive piece
of legislation. Indeed, it may be viewed as the first step toward enactment of a more general statute authorizing or even requiring commitment for observation of additional classes of criminals. In Massachusetts, for instance, pre-trial psychiatric examination is had of
persons who are charged with a capital offense or who have previously been convicted of a felony, or who have twice previously
been indicted.98 This is the famous Briggs law, first adopted in
1921. According to a study made in 1950 of 500 Briggs-law cases
selected at random, 18% of those examined were found to be mentally ill, mentally defective, or of borderline mentality. 99 Sweden, Denmark, and various other countries have similar laws providing for pretrial medical examination of offenders to determine their mental condition. 100 Massachusetts in addition has a "defective delinquent" law,
first adopted in 1911, which authorizes a district attorney, at any
time prior to the final disposition of a case, to apply for commitment
of any defendant over the age of 15 who is charged with a crime,
other than murder, which creates a danger to life or limb. 1 1 The
alleged defective delinquent is then examined by a psychiatrist, and
if his finding is affirmative, a hearing is held to determine whether
the defendant should be committed to an appropriate institution. 10 2
Some states, such as Minnesota, have enacted legislation permitting
civil commitment of dangerous sexual psychopaths independently
of any criminal proceeding. 103 The United States Supreme Court
sustained the constitutionality of the Minnesota statute against
10 4 It
objections that it denied due process and equal protection.
would seem, a fortiori, that the West Virginia statute is constitu97

GUTrMACBEa AND WEUhoFEN, op. cit. supra note 96, at 116-117.
98 MASS. ANN. LAws c. 123, § 100A (1949),

99
Flower, The Psychiatric Examination of Offenders in Massachusetts, in
PsYCHAThY AND Tom LAw 97 (Hoch and Zubin eds. 1955); Note, Psychiatric
Court Clinics, 29 TEMp. L.Q. 347 (1956).
100 Biggs, Procedures for Handling the Mentally-Ill Offender in Some
European Countries, 29 TEMP. L.Q. 254 (1956).
101
MAss. ANN. LAws c. 123, §§ 113-124 (1949).
l02 Williams, A Statutory Consideration of the Defective Delinquent in
New 10
England, 36 B.U.L. REv. 268 (1956).

3 Biccs, THE GuirTY Mn-w-PsycATRAY AND THE LAW OF HoMIcmE

166 (1955).
This is an excellent book.
104
Minnesota v. Probate Court, 308 U.S. 270 (1940).
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tional since it applies only where the defendant has been arrested
and charged with crime.
The new West Virginia statute and comparable statutes elsewhere may also be viewed as a new approach to the problem of
the habitual criminal or recidivist. (Professor Brown, in his careful
study of the West Virginia habitual criminal statute made for the
legislature, reports that the present statute is so harsh and severe
that it is largely nullified in practice; moreover, when the statute
is strictly applied, this results in discriminatory treatment of some
criminals as compared with others with like records). 1O5 Since experience has shown that prison life fails to reform such persons, the
new legislation affords an opportunity to see whether psychiatric
treatment and counselling will be more effective. This may lead
one to ponder such things as the proper objectives of criminal law,
the best methods of prison administration, and the nature of the
criminal. Not only is the law a seamless web; in its ultimate problems it is a part of a greater web comprising all the social sciences.
VII.

INsA=rrr

AS A CRnmNAL DEFENsE

Our discussion now brings us to the situation where the defendant offers to prove that he is not guilty by reason of insanity.
(On the use of the term "insanity" see text at note 86 supra. It is
significant that the defense of insanity is usually presented only
in capital cases, typically murder, because when on trial for a lesser
offense, the defendant usually prefers the possibility of a fairly definite prison term to that of an indefinite stay at a mental hospital and
the later stigma of having been there.10 6 )
One of the important problems now being discussed in the
field of criminal law is the problem of responsibility. When should
the defendant be excused because of mental illness or defect? (In
the next section we shall consider the related question of when the
defendant should be excused because of youth.) This subject is
the focal point of a great part of the recent writing on psychology
and the law. Few rules of law are being subjected to as much
criticism at present as is the McNaghten rule.' 07 This rule is the
105 Brown, West Virginia Habitual Criminal Law, 59 W. VA. L.

REV.

30,

87-38106(1956).

Satten, The Concept of Responsibility, 4 KAN. L. RExv. 361, 368 (1956);
To PusiH 146.

WEiaHOFEN,
THE UnGE
07
1

The name MeNaghten is spelled at least four different ways. In the

original report it is spelled "M'Naghten". Also the rule is sometime called the
rules or the test(s).
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classic common-law test of insanity. It is the law in the majority
of the states, England, Canada, and most of the rest of the commonlaw world.108 It was declared to be the law of West Virginia in
State v. Harrison in 1892 in the following language:
"A person partially insane is yet responsible for a criminal act,
if at the time of the act he knows right from wrong, and knows
the nature and character of the particular act and its consequences, and knows that it is wrong and is hurtful to another,
and deserves punishment. In such case no mere irresistible
impulse to do the act will exempt him from criminal responsibility for such an act...."109
Fourteen states and a few other jurisdictions accept as a corollary to the MeNaghten test the "irresistible impulse" test.110 This
test the West Virginia court specifically rejected in the last sentence
quoted above. Under this corollary the defendant may be found
insane, even if he did know the nature and character of the act
and that it was wrong, if in addition it can be shown that he could
not resist his impulse to do the act.
The critics of the McNaghten rule point out that it is based on
the state of medical knowledge of England in 1843. They urge that
the rule should be discarded, or at least reworded in favor of a
rule which is consonant with modem scientific knowledge. Indeed,
almost all of the science of psychiatry has been developed in this
century. Thirty-six years ago the late Judge John C. McWhorter
of Upshur County put the argument for modernization very clearly
in his provocative essay, "The Test of Criminality as to Acts of
Insane Persons-Is it Law, Barbarism or Both?":"'
10S See text infra at note 143.
10986 W. Va. 729, 730, 15 S.E. 982 (1892). Cf. the language of the
original, Daniel M'Naghten, 10 Cl. & F. 200, 209, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843):
"The jury ought to be told in all cases that every man is presumed to be sane,
and to possess a sufficient degree of reason to be responsible for his crimes,
until the contrary be proved to their satisfaction- and that, to establish a
defence on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved that, at the time
of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and
quality of the act he was doin,, or if he did know it, that he did not know
he was doing what was wrong.' It will be noted that the West Virginia test
adds to the original the requirements that the defendant know the act is hurtful to another and that it deserves punishment. I will not comment on these
differences, because in this state there are so few cases that in practical effect
the difference
in wording is probably insignificant.
11
0WEmoFEN1, MENTAL DISEASE AS A CmIaNMAL DEFENSE 51 (1954).
The neighboring states of Virginia and Kentucky are in this group. Hall says
that only ten states have this test instead of fourteen. Hall, InDefense of the
McNaghten Rules, 42 A.B.A.J. 917, 984 (1956). See HALL, GENERAL PINcnPLES OF CmanAL LAw c. 14 (1947).
11127 W. VA. L.Q. 213-14 (1921).
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"Whatever may have been the status of mental science
when the Harrison Case was decided and whatever may have
been the learning of the court on that subject at the time, it
is certainly now well established that insane persons may have
keen perceptions of right and wrong and may know the nature
and character of their acts, whether they are wrong and
whether they are hurtful to others, and understand clearly that
they are wrong and may deserve punishment; and yet, in the
grasp of a homicidal mania, the inhibitory thought may be so
tardy and the will power so paralyzed, as to render such persons
at the particular moment utterly incapable of choosing and following an opposite course.
"Laws shielding insane persons from criminal punishment
simply reflect the conscience of an enlightened humanity which
revolts at the idea of treating so harshly and cruelly such unfortunates. This refined, humane sentiment certainly rests upon
the moral irresponsibility of such persons, not only on account
of their incapacity to know right from wrong, but also on
account of their mental incapacity to choose and follow the
right course at the time of the act. It is their lack of moral
responsibility that exempts them, and this moral irresponsibility
may arise from their mental inability to choose and follow, as
well as to know, the right from the wrong course."
Those who would reform the McNaghten rule may be divided
roughly into two groups. The first group consists of those who
would merely reword the rule so as to clarify it and include the
concept of inability to control one's conduct (the idea of irresistible
impulse, but broader). Judge McWhorter and the American Law
Institutes Model Penal Code represent this viewpoint (to be discussed below). The second group proposes a more radical change:
those in this group would altogether discard the McNaghten rule
in favor of a simply worded test of responsibility based on psychiatric knowledge, such as the test adopted in the Durham case,
viz., the defendant is not responsible if his conduct was the product
of mental illness (this case will be discussed below).
Let us examine these proposals in more detail. First, however, it should be noted that the McNaghten rule itself does not
mean the same thing to all people. Some, particularly its more
severe critics, say that the rule fails to take account of the defendant's ability to control his conduct even when he knows the
nature and character of his act and knows that it is wrong. These
critics point to the development of the irresistible impulse corollary
as a recognition that the McNaghten rule standing alone falls short
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in this respect. Furthermore, they say, even with the irresistible
impulse test added, the McNaghten rule still falls short for two
reasons: (1) irresistible impulse suggests a sudden urge, whereas
in reality the impairment of a person's capacity to control his antisocial desires may develop gradually so that his control gives way
in a moment of unusual stress; (2) the rule fails to take account
of the unconscious mind, which is a potent force in determining
conduct. 112 By contrast some authorities aver that the McNaghten
rule itself, properly interpreted, includes lack of capacity to control
one's conduct. 113 Professor Hall, for example, would substitute the
following rule for the McNaghten rule:
"A crime is not committed by anyone who, because of a mental
disease, is unable to understand what he is doing and to control his conduct at the time he commits a harm forbidden by
criminal law. In deciding this question with reference to the
criminal conduct with which a defendant is charged, the trier
of the facts should decide (1) whether because of mental disease, the defendant lacked the capacity to understand the physical nature and consequences of his conduct; and (2) whether,
because of such disease, the defendant lacked the capacity to
realize that it was morally wrong to commit the harm in
question."'1
It is significant that Hall does not regard this as a change in the
McNaghten rule but merely a clarification of its true meaning.
In defense of the McNaghten rule it is said that in practice it
is not strictly applied, hence just decisions usually result. Some of
the witnesses who appeared before the British Royal Commission
on Capital Punishment observed that juries apply the rule liberally
where proof of mental illness is strong, whereas in the borderline
cases if the mentally ill defendant is convicted, he may nevertheless
be saved from imprisonment on the advice of a medical examination
after trial or be saved from execution by a reprieve from the Home
Secretary. 115 Justice Frankfurter, appearing before the same Commission, commented that much the same practice is common in
some American states, except that the governor stands in the place
112

On the unconscious mind, see text following note 12 supra.

113 Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J. 761, 774

(1956); Davidson, Criminal Responsibility; the Quest for a Formula, in Psy-

cHATRY AND THE LAW (Hoch and Zubin eds. 1955); 2 STEPHEN, HIsToiY OF
ENGLISH CuNM
. LAw 171 (1883).
114 Hall, supra note 113, at 781.
115 ROYAL CommssoN ON CAPIrAL PuNisH mENT, REPORT 85-88 (1953).
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of the Home Secretary. 116 However, Frankfurter went on to comment as follows:

"If you find rules that are, broadly speaking, discredited
by those who have to administer them... then I think the law
serves its best interests by trying to be more honest about it
...

to have rules which cannot rationally be justified, except

by a process of interpretation which distorts and often practically nullifies them... is not a desirable system . . . I am

a great believer in being as candid as possible about my institutions. They are in large measure abandoned in practice, and
therefore I think the M'Naghten Rules are in large measure
shams. That is a strong word, but I think the M'Naghten Rules
are very difficult for conscientious people, and not711difficult
enough for people who say, 'We'll just juggle them'."
We now consider the view that the MoNaghten rule does not
include the test of capacity to control one's conduct and that the
rule should be changed to include this concept. The American Law
Institute proposed the following basic rule on responsibility in its
Model Penal Code, tentative draft No. 4 (1955):118
"Section 4.01. Mental disease or defect excluding responsi"(1) A person is not responsible
for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the
criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of law.
"(2) The terms 'mental disease or defect' do not include
an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social conduct.
"Alternative formulations of paragraph (1).
"(a) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect his capacity either to appreciate the criminality of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law
is so substantially impaired that he cannot justly be held
responsible.
"(b) A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if
at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or
defect he lacks substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality
of his conduct or is in such state that the prospect of convic-

bilty

116 See also ROBINSON, LAW AND TE LAwYEis 74-79 (1935).
117 Id. at 102; also appears in FRANKFuRTER, OF LAw AND ME N 95 (1956).
118 The draft, with appendices, appears in 46 J. Cnvm. L., C. & P.S. 450

(1955).
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lion and punishment cannot constitute a significant restraining
influence upon him."
This formulation of the rule is subject to possible future amendment
by the American Law Institute; however, the thorough study and
discussion which preceded the presentation of the draft, as well
as the outstanding ability of Professor Wechsler, the reporter, argue
that the final form will be similar to the principal formulation above.
The Supreme Court of Mexico has recently adopted a rule very
much like that formulation, declaring that even if the defendant
knew the nature and quality of his act and that it was wrong, he
nevertheless cannot be found guilty "if by reason of disease of the
mind, defendant has been deprived of or has lost the power of his
will which would enable him to prevent himself from doing the
19
act".1
A few years before the American Law Institute study of
criminal law was launched in the United States, a Royal Commission on Capital Punishment was created in England to study the
question of abolition of capital punishment and related matters.
The Commission was made up of a distinguished group of subjects
headed by Sir Ernest Gowers. The Commission decided to include
in their study insanity and mental deficiency as criminal defenses,
since it was believed that the existence of capital punishment sometimes encouraged the use of these defenses. 12 0 After a very thorough
study and after hearing the testimony of medical and legal representatives and public officials, the Commission reached the following
conclusions:' 12 1 (1) that the test of responsibility laid down by the
McNaghten rules is so defective that the law ought to be changed;
(2) if the rules are amended, it would be desirable to add a test
of volition, i.e., that the accused should be exonerated or held only
partially responsible 12 2 if he was incapable of preventing himself
from committing the act (the minority of the Commission members
were in favor of going no further than this change in the law, a
view quite similar to the ALI proposal; the New Mexico court 12 3
119 State v. White, 58 N.M. 824, 270 P.2d 727, 731 (1954).
120 See text at note 106 supra.
121 The first three conclusions are found in the ComnvssioN's REPoRT 116

(1953).
122The doctrine of partial responsibility is the law in Scotland. Cf.,
MormEAND, THE LAw oF Homwc E 298 et seq. (1952); he proposes to classify
mental disorder into degrees for purposes of administration of criminal law,
with only mental disorder of a high degree being permitted as a defense to
the most heinous crimes.
123 Supra note 119.
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cited the Royal Commission minority view); (8) that a preferable
amendment would be to abrogate the McNaghten rules and "leave
the jury to determine whether at the time of the act the accused was
suffering from disease of the mind (or mental deficiency) to such
a degree that he ought not be held responsible"; (4) whatever rule
is used, mental deficiency should be expressly assimilated to insanity
in relation to the question of criminal responsibility;' 24 (5) the judge
should have the power to raise the issue of insanity when the
defense does not do so;125 (6) the present system of medical inquiries after conviction should be retained as a safeguard in those
cases in which neither the defense nor the judge raises the defense
of insanity.' 2 6
Although in England the recommendations of the Royal Commission have been largely rejected by Parliament, they have had
some influence in this country, especially in the literature on insanity and the law. In Durham v. United States,12 7 the Court of
Appeals of the District of Columbia relied in part on the Royal
Commission Report in overruling the MoNaghten irresistible impulse test and declaring a new test of insanity.
Indeed, the Durham case is the rallying point for those who
would completely discard the McNaghten rule. Few cases in recent
years have excited more widespread attention and comment. 128 In
the Durham case the court said that henceforth the test would be
"simply that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful
act was the product of mental disease or mental defect .... ,"129 The
case is well worth reading as an illustration of the extent to which
nonlegal materials may be used in a judicial opinion.13 0 Also it is
remarkable in that the part of the opinion declaring the new test appears to be obiter dicta, since the court could have decided only
the question of which side had the burden of proof of insanity once
this defense was presented. Also, the case was apparently reargued
for the purpose of developing the more important question. It looks
as though the court of appeals wanted to overrule the McNaghten12 4

RoYAL COMMIUSSION ON CAPrrAL PuNISHMENT, REPORT 123 (1953).

125 Id. at 156.
126 Id. at 129.
127 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).

128 WEHOFEN, THE URGE To PuNisH 8; see Note, Criminal Law-Defenses-nsanity--New Test, 57 W. VA. L. REv. 99 (1955); Note, Criminal
Law-Re-examination of Tests for Criminal Responsibility, 53 MicH. L. REv.
963 (1955).
129 214 F.2d 874.
130 See section I supra.
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irresistible impulse test and seized on this case as a vehicle for doing
so. Such is the judicial process. The Durham rule does have some
American precedent: a similar test was announced in New Hampshire in 1869,131 apparently partly on the basis of correspondence
between Justice Doe and Dr. Isaac Ray, a leading psychiatrist of
that day.132 Professor Weihofen enthusiastically urges adoption of
the Durham rule in other jurisdictions. 133 Solicitor General Sobeloff,
(now a judge on the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals) approved
the Durham decision in a very good article. 134 Leading forensic
psychiatrists have approved the decision,' 3 5 although it does not
go as far as the recommendation of the Group for the Advancement
of Psychiatry that the test simply be: "No person shall be convicted
...when at the time he committed the act.., he was suffering
from mental illness." Mental illness is defined as "an illness which
so lessens the capacity of the person to use.., his judgment, discretion and control in the conduct of his affairs as to warrant his
commitment to a mental institution."13 6 Judge Biggs of the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals, who has made a thorough study of the
subject of insanity and the law, approves the Durham rule but fears
that certain language in the opinion may lead to difficulty in future
administration of the rule.13 7 Justice Douglas believes the significant thing about the Durham rule is that it "enables the psychiatrist
to testify in his own language and to give evidence that is relevant
by the standards known to him. "138
Advocates of reform of the McNaghten rule, taking a comparative law approach, 3 9 point to the law of various European countries as being more enlightened than the McNaghten rule. In the
131 State v. Pike, 49 N.H. 399 (1869); State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 396 (1871).
See Weihofen, The Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. Cm. L. Riv. 356
(1955).
132 Reik, The Doe-Ray Correspondence: A Pioneer Collaboration in the
Jurisprudence
of Mental Disease, 63 YA. E L.J. 183 (1953).
1 33
W=oFEN, THE URGE To PUNISH, passim.

134 Sobeloff, Insanity and the Criminal Law: From MoNaghten to Durham
and Beyond, 41 A.B.A.J. 793 (1955). But see reply by Hall, Responsibility
and Law: in Defense of the McNaghten Rules, 42 id. 917 (1956).
135 See various articles in symposium, Insanity and the Criminal Law-A
Critique of Durham v. U. S., 22 U. Cm. L. RBv. 317 (1955).
136 CMImNAL RESPONSIBILITY AND PsycIATnmc EXPERT TESTIMONY, Rep.

26, p. 8 (1954), quoted in Moreland, Mental Responsibility and the Criminal
Law-A Defense, 45 KY. L.J. 215, 229 (1956-57).
137 BIGGs, THE GUILTY MInD 155 (1955). See his dissent in Smith ex rel.
Baldi v. United States, 192 F.2d 540, 561-68 (3d Cir. 1951).
138 Address by Douglas, Law and Psychiatry, graduation exercises of
Vhte Institute of Psychiatry, Jan. 28, 1956.
139On comparative law and legal provincialism see Mueller, Book Review,
58 W. VA. L. REv. 213 (1956).
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Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden the test of responsibility is whether the defendant had a mental illness or mental defect
at the time he committed the act. The answer to these questions
is determined upon medical evidence.' 40 This test is similar to that
proposed by the Group for the Advancement of Psychiatry. 14 1 In
Belgium, France, Italy, and Switzerland the defendant is not responsible if he lacked understanding and control of his act. 142 Thus
in all these countries the test of responsibility is more in conformity
with current psychiatic knowledge than is the McNaghten test. In
the common-law world, the conventional McNaghten rule obtains
in Canada, New Zealand, India, Pakistan, Ceylon, and three states
of Australia. The McNaghten rule plus the irresistible impulse test
obtains in South Africa, Southern Rhodesia, and the other three
states of Australia. 4 3
If so much is wrong with the McNaghten rule, why then has
it not been changed before now? Various explanations have been
offered. Some say the courts have merely adhered to precedent in
the more conservative common-law tradition. Hall declares that the
McNaghten rule conforms to common sense, reflecting the intelligent
thinking of generations. 144 Moreland asserts that the procedural
145
difficulties of administering any other rule would be very great.

Weihofen offers the explanation that the McNaghten rule reflects
the attitude of society that the offender should not "get off" on
grounds of insanity when he has committed a serious crime, except
in very clear cases. This attitude he calls "the urge to punish" and
compares it to the desire for capital punishment.' 4 6 A change in
the rule, Weihofen believes, calls for a more humane and informed
public attitude about crime and mental disorder. A psychiatrist
offers the related viewpoint that the criminal law with its "legal
machinery of guilt-fastening and penalty-imposing" is a continuation
of traditional methods of rearing children rather than a rational
choice of constructive social action in dealing with offenders. 147 A
14 0

American Law Institute, Responsibility, MODEL P AL CODE (Tent
Draft No. 4), Appx. A, also printed in 46 J. Cainm. L., C. & P.S. 450, 459
1955). Cf. ROYAL COMnISSION ON CAPrrAL PuNsmHENT, REPORT 107-09
1953). See also Biggs, Procedures for Handling the Mentally Ill Offender in
Some European Countries, 29 TEmP. L.Q. 254 (1956).
1412 See note 136 supra.
14 American Law Institute, supra note 140.
143 Ibid.
144 HALL, supra note 134.
145 Moreland, supra note 136.
146 WEmHOFEN, THE UnGE To PuNIsH c. 6.
14T Roche, Criminal Responsibility, in PsycmATRY AND ThE LAW 107, 115
(Hoch and Zubin eds. 1955).
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British psychiatrist expounds the theory that the criminal law is a
deterrent to keep the average person law-abiding rather than merely
the criminally inclined. 148 It follows that trial and sentencing is a
symbolic ritual in which the criminal is the scapegoat for the lawabiding members of the community. And at this point the argument
broadens into more general questions that vex society, questions of
crime and criminology that are beyond the scope of this paper. It
is to be hoped that more and more lawyers will read books and
articles on criminology, for it should be recognized that progress in
the law cannot come merely from looking backward at the precedents and extending to new situations the principles there found.
What does all this mean for West Virginia? Does our state
have the best rule it could have on insanity and the law, from the
point of view of justice to the accused? Should the rule be applied
to juveniles, as it was in a recent case at Wheeling? (This case will
be discussed in the next section.) Does the rule apply to the mentally defective as well as the mentally ill? In view of the Durham
decision and the growing pressure from the kind of legal and medical opinion which influenced this decision, it seems probable that
many courts will be asked to reconsider their tests of insanity. Whatever decision the Supreme Court of Appeals or the legislature of
West Virginia makes when the issue is presented, there will certainly
be plenty of material, legal and nonlegal, to work with. Recently
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the Durham rule, preferring to abide by the McNaghten precedent. 149 On the other
hand, Minnesota has cited the Durham case as authority in an
unusual civil case. 150 A husband and wife owned a farm as joint
tenants with right of survivorship. The wife had children by a former marriage. The husband killed the wife, and in a prosecution
for murder he was found insane at the time of trial and therefore
could not be prosecuted. The children by the former marriage
brought suit for declaration of a constructive trust in their favor
as to half the real estate. The lower court applied the right-wrong
148 West, A Psychological Theory of Law, in INTERP
LE AL PHmosopHms 767 (Sayre ed. 1947).

-rTTONS OF MODERN

149 Anderson v. United States, 237 F.2d 118, 127-28 (1956).

The issue

was not presented squarely and probably did not receive the attention it
deserved. Moreover, the persuasiveness of the opinion is somewhat lessened
by an unseenily tone of sarcasm.

15OAnderson v. Grasberg, 78 N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1956) (5-2 decision).
See Comment, 45 GEO. L.J. 520 (1957).
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test in determining whether the husband was insane at the time of
the homicide, concluded that he was insane, and held for the plaintiffs. The supreme court reversed, saying 'Wefeel that the better
rule to be applied to the case before us is that the slayer will not
be barred from taking the property where his unlawful act was the
product of mental disease."15 The court explained that this holding
did not change the rule in criminal cases.
VIII. Jti

q=

DELINQUENCY AND CmtL
JUVME
COURTS

WELvAm;

Juvenile delinquency and child welfare are two faces of the
same coin. The purpose of child welfare legislation is to promote
the mental, physical and social health of children, thus tending to
prevent delinquency. On the other hand when guidance and supervision are needed for the juvenile offender, the juvenile courts
and industrial schools depend on the social worker specializing in
child welfare. It is appropriate to consider juvenile delinquency at
this point, for alongside the postulate that the mentally disordered
are not to be held responsible for crime stands the related postulate
that immature offenders are likewise to be excused, since they have
not developed full responsibility-or at least that these young people
are to be treated in special ways appropriate for their years.
Few problems are more in the public eye at present than juvenile delinquency. In 1953 a special subcommittee of the Judiciary
Committee of the United States Senate was appointed to study the
problem. This subcommittee reported that, according to figures
compiled by the Children's Bureau of the Department of Health,
Welfare, and Education, the number of children appearing in juvenile courts increased from 300,000 in 1948 to 485,000 in 1953, and
that only ten per cent of this increase could be attributed to the
increase in juvenile population. 152 Figures for Kanawha County,
West Virginia, correspond to the national trend: the number of
youths appearing before the Kanawha Juvenile Court increased
from 108 in 1950 to 244 in 1954.153 The Senate subcommittee also
reported that there are at least three juvenile offenders known to the
police who are not referred to juvenile courts for each offender who is
referred there.' 5 4 For the year 1956 the F. B. I. reported that major
151 78 N.W.2d 461.

152

153

154

S. REP. No. 61, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1955).
KANAWHA WELFA E CouNcIL, Otr TROuBLmD CILDREN

Note 152 supra.
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crimes in the United States increased by 13.3 per cent over 1955,
and that nearly 46 per cent of the arrests in such cases in urban areas
were of juveniles under 18 years of age. In 1953 more than half
of all automobile thefts were committed by juveniles. 155 While
delinquency was at one time chiefly a big-city problem, this is
no longer true; delinquency in jurisdictions of less than 100,000
increased by more than 50 per cent from 1948 to 1952, while increasing only 29 per cent in jurisdictions of 100,000 or more. 156 A
representative of the American Psychological Association told the
Senate subcommittee that "For every juvenile who actually engages
in delinquent behavior-or who is caught in delinquent behaviorthere are hundreds or thousands who may have delinquent tendencies or who fail in subtle and socially harmless, but still dreadfully
15 7
crippling ways, to make a full and creative adjustment to life."

A large amount of material is available on the subject of juvenile delinquency. 158 From the many studies which have been made
certain conclusions may be drawn. First is that the delinquent is
usually a person who is in conflict with himself, his parents, the
community, or a combination of these. These conflicts are caused
by the various forces which interact to shape the personality of the
child in his first five or six years. One of the most important influences is the child's relationship with his parents. When this relationship is poor or is disrupted, the child feels rejected and may
become hostile, suspicious, and aggressive. Studies have shown
that it is not so much the broken home which breeds delinquency
as the home in which the child is rejected. 59 Another important
factor is the neighborhood: such undesirable features as overcrowding, lack of sanitation, and presence of adult and juvenile lawbreakers usually characterize slum neighborhoods, whether found in the
older dwellings in a city or along the banks of a creek leading up
the hollow. It takes unusual parental leadership to produce well
balanced children in such an environment.1 6 0 Another factor is the
physical continuity of the home: too frequent moves make a child
feel rootless. One 13-year old delinquent complained, "We've moved
155 Discussion by Hendrickson, U. Chi. Rdtable, June 27, 1954, 5.

156Address by Beck, American Public Welfare Ass'n, Dec. 4, 1958, reprinted in PuB. WELF., Apr. 1954, and in U. Chi. Rdtable, June 27, 1954, 15.
157 Quoted in Fn-E, 1,000,000 DELINQUENTS 26 (1955).

158 The works of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck are outstanding, such as

UNRAVEING

JuvEN

E DELiNQuENcY

159 FINE, 1,000,000 DELnqUENTs
160 Beck, supra note 156, at 13.

(1951).

75-82.
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so much in the last few years that I don't know where I belong. I
have no friends. They've made their own lives before I get there."u 6 1
Also such handicaps as defective mentality, organic disease of the
nervous system, abnormal size for one's age, and speech defects may
cause delinquency insofar as they "impair the child's success in
2
society."'16
163
Still another factor is the morality of the adult community.
When adults flout the law or greatly overemphasize the material
gains in life, they set a bad example for youth. Consider the typical
attitudes of adults toward violation of traffic, parking, and highway
regulations. And what about the federal income tax? Too many
adults set an example of "not getting caught." Also the periodic
scandals in state, local, and even national government are disillusioning to youth. 164 Nor are business and labor groups without
blame in this connection, as recent congressional investigations have
revealed. This descripiton of the moral climate of the United States
should strike home to lawyers, for they stand in positions of leadership in the local community and in government at all levels, and
they often advise the conduct of their clients for good or ill. Indeed,
the ethics of lawyers themselves are a part of the moral environment; it is noteworthy that the American Bar Association is currently
making a comprehensive re-examination of the canons of ethics with
165
a view to extending them to cover new kinds of situations.
Such are the chief causes and patterns of delinquency. What
are the solutions to the problem? Just as the causes of delinquency
are many, so also are the methods of prevention and control.1 66
There are two general approaches, treatment of the individual and
improvement of the general environment. 167 These two approaches
overlap to some extent. The individual approach emphasizes such
things as child guidance clinics, "big brother" projects, and better
juvenile courts and state training schools (the term "reform school'
16 1 FiNE, 1,000,000 DELINQUENTS 100.
162

Pearce, Physical and Mental Features of the Juvenile Delinquent, in

MENTAL
ABNOmRALrrY AND CIME 280 (Radzinowicz
16
3 FINE, 1,000,000 DELiNQUENTS 115.
164 See DOUGLAS, ETHnCs IN GOVERNMENT (1952).

& Turner eds. 1944).

165 McCoy, The Canons of Ethics: A Reappraisal by the Organized Bar,
43 A.B.A.J. 38 (1957).
160 The Kanawha Welfare Council offered 52 proposals. OtR TROUBLED
CmLmRnN 67-73 (1957). The council is an association of social agencies, civic
groups, public officials, and interested citizens.
167 Stllken, Misconceptions About Juvenile Delinquency, 46 J. CPRi.
L., C. & P.S. 833, 840 (1956).
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is being discarded). The environmental approach favors better
recreational facilities, slum clearance and urban renewal plans, 16s
and improvement of the public schools, e.g., in training teachers
to recognize and help potential delinquents. At times new legislation is proposed to combat delinquency, such as the recent war on
"comic books." 169 Another example is the statute recently adopted
in West Virginia imposing civil liability on parents for their children's acts of willful destruction of property.' 7 0 While laws of
this kind help property owners, they are often ineffective in helping the child, since the original cause of his delinquency remains
untreated. 171
Juvenile Courts. Of special interest to lawyers and judges is
the juvenile court movement. The first true juvenile court was
established in Chicago in 1899, although there had been forerunners
elsewhere before that time.172 The idea gradually spread to other
states, until by 1945 there were juvenile courts in every state. The
juvenile court is a court of equity, and the juvenile is a ward of the
court. The latter concept may be traced to the historic theory that
the king was the ultimate parent of all minors and that he acted in
loco parentis for their welfare. 17 Roscoe Pound has called the juvenile court "the greatest advance in judicial history since the Magna
Charta." 174 A judge of the Children's Court of Westchester County,
New York, wrote as follows:
"The general philosophy of the juvenile court rejects the
theory that we are engaged basically in the enforcement of the
criminal law. Primarily these courts were created to shield
children from criminal court surroundings; to bring them into
new tribunals where they might be considered not as criminals,
168 On urban renewal, see W. VA. CODE c. 16,

169 Cellhorn

art. 18 (Michie Supp. 1957).

points out that there is no proof that reading comic books

causes juvenile delinquency. Indeed, no reading is a more pressing danger than
bad reading. GELLHORN, INDIVmuAL FREEDOm
AND GOVERNMENTAL REsTRAINTs 103 (1956).
170 W. Va. Acts 1957, c. 1; W. VA. CODE c. 55, art. 7A (Michie Supp.

1957).
'I Fine, 1,000,000 DELINQUENTS 137; U.S. CHILDREN's BUREU~, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADM'N, DEPT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, PARENTS AND

DELINQUENCY (Witmer ed. 1954).
172 Chute,

The Juvenile Court in Retrospect, Fed. Prob., Sept. 1949, p. 3,

reprinted in VEDDER, TnE JUVENILE OFFENDER 233 (1954). See generally
BLOcH73AND FLYNN, DELINQUENCY c. 12 (1956).
1 TEETRS AND REIN
B,
THE CHALLENGE OF DELINQUENCY 280

(1950).

:174

Quoted in Chute, supra note 172. See Pound, The Rise of Socialized

Criminal Justice, in YEARBoox OF NATIONAL PROBATION & PAROLE Ass'N 1

(1942).
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but as children in need of aid, protection, and guidance; tribunals in which a new type of individualized justice might be
practiced, dependent not upon the offense committed, but upon
the needs of the child; tribunals where programs of education
and social work designed for the rehabilitation of homes would
supplant time-dishonored sentencing of children and the further
breakdown of the home.
"The entire emphasis was placed upon the integration of
moral training, education, social work, and physical and mental
hygiene in the court or authoritative setting. A new concept
appeared-the concept of a legal tribunal wedded to the social
sciences; a combined socio-legal institution. . . .175
The system of juvenile courts in West Virginia leaves much
to be desired. Provision for juvenile courts was first made in 1915,176
and the law was considerably revised in 1986 and again in 1939 as
part of a general statute on child welfare.'7 7 The legislature conferred juvenile court jurisdiction upon the circuit court or a subordinate court of record in each county.' 7 8 Jurisdiction of the juvenile court is limited to petitions to have a child declared delinquent
or neglected, as defined by statute.17 9 (Proposed expansion of this
jurisdiction will be discussed below.) The statute also provides:
"Except as to a violation of law which if committed by an adult
would be a capital offense, the juvenile court shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and determine criminal charges, including a
charge of violation of a municipal ordinance, against a person who
is under eighteen years of age at the time of the alleged offense." 180
The juvenile court may retain continuing jurisdiction of such offenders until they reach the age of 21, unless they are discharged
or are committed to a correctional or other institution. 181 The effectiveness of the age provision has apparently been undermined recently by a court decision and an opinion of the attorney general. 82
175 The Juvenile Court and Delinquent Parents, Fed. Prob., Mar. 1949,
p. 12, reprinted in VEDDER, Tr JuvENI. OFFNDR
294.
176W. Va. Acts 1915, c. 70; W. VA. CODE c. 46A (Barnes 1928).
177 W. Va. Acts 1986 1st Ex. Sess., c. 1; W. Va. Acts 1939, c. 105; W. VA.
CoDE c. 49, art. 5 (Michie 1955).
178 W. VA. CoDn c. 49, art. 5, § 1 (Michie 1955).
179 Id. art. 5, § 2, and art. 1, §3, 4.
180 Id. art. 5, § 3.
181 Id.§ 2.
182 State ex rel. Wade v. Skeen, 140 W. Va. 565, 85 S.E.2d 845 (1955).

W. VA. Ops. ATrry GENr., Feb. 22, 1957. See Note, "Exclusive" Jurisdictionof
the Juvenile Courts, 59 W. VA. L. Rnv. 362 (1957). The Wade case held
that the circuit court need not transfer a juvenile burglary case to itself sitting

as juvenile court, since this would be a needless formality. The Attorney General then opined that the juvenile court statute does not preclude prosecution
of juveniles in the circuit court.
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A decision such as this tends to obscure the difference in treatment
which the legislature intended as between adult and juvenile offenders. Part of the philosophy of the juvenile court is lost when the
juvenile is tried in open court like an adult offender.
The juvenile court statute also provides that a child under 16
shall not be confined in a jail or police station, except that if he is
over 14 and has been committed to an industrial home or correctional institution, he may be held in the "juvenile department" of
the jail while awaiting transportation. 8 3 Few counties provide a
suitable "juvenile department", hence children are held in common
jails in many places in this state.18 4 Moreover some of the child
shelters-the places where delinquent and neglected children are
supposed to be held temporarily-fall short of desirable standards.
Frequently the county courts for political reasons appoint poorly
qualified persons as superintendents. Often the atmosphere of these
shelters is more that of a prison than a shelter. The statute lacks
any provision for supervision of the shelters by the state child
welfare authority, and even the local authority may give advice only
at the instance of the county court.18 5
The Department of Public Assistance, through its Division of
Child Welfare, plays an important part in administration of the
juvenile courts. Unfortunately relations betwen the juvenile court
judges and the D. P. A. are often strained;' 86 this trouble seems
to stem in part from a difference in professional viewpoint and in
part from unsatisfactory statutory provisions. Social workers from
the Child Welfare Division usually prepare the petition to have a
child declared delinquent or neglected.' 8 7 The local child welfare
director and his assistants serve as probation officers for the juvenile
court, 188 whereas prior to 1936 the juvenile judge could appoint his
own probation officers.' 8 9 A child welfare worker serves as parole
officer for a youth paroled from a state industrial school-often
without the knowledge of the juvenile judge who sent the youth
183 W. VA. CODE c. 49, art. 5, § 15 (Michie 1955).

184 Calhoun, Report of Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, W. VA. BAR
Ass' 1956 ANN. lEP. 50, 54. The subject was on the program for the 1957
meeting. See generally McCormick, Children in Our Jails, 261 ANNALS 150
(1949);
Fnro, 1,000,000 DELiNQuENTs 285.
85
1 W. VA. CODE c. 49, art. 6, § 13 (Michie 1955).
186 Calhoun, supra note 184, at 52. See Hammond v. Dep't of Public
Assistance, 95 S.E.2d 345 (W. Va. 1956).
187W. VA. CODE c. 49, art. 5, § 7, and art. 6, § 1 (Michie 1955).
188 Id. art. 5, § 17.

189 W. VA. RE:,v. CODE: c. 49, art. 2, § 5 (1931).
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there. A neglected child may be committed to the custody of the
D. P. A.190 The juvenile judges complain that the child welfare
workers have divided loyalties, sometimes following the policies of
the D. P. A., which employs them, rather than the policies of the
juvenile court. On the other hand the social workers complain that
some judges lack a basic understanding of modem concepts of child
welfare. To help this ambivalent situation it would be well to restore
to the juvenile judge the power to appoint his own probation officers, as recommended by Judge Calhoun's committee of the West
192
Virginia Bar Association. 19 1 This is the practice in most states.
It is anomalous that the circuit judge may appoint his own probation officers but the juvenile judge may not. Of course all probation
officers should be properly qualified persons selected according to
ierit and removable only for cause. It has also been proposed that
only specially qualified lawyers should serve as juvenile judges. 198
A few states have created a state-wide juvenile court with a small
number of judges who if necessary go on circuit, hearing only juvenile cases. 194 This reform assures greater uniformity in disposition
of juvenile cases throughout the state as well as usually increasing
the competence of the judges.
Another proposal for improvement of juvenile courts is that
their subject matter jurisdiction be expanded. The omnibus child
welfare bill presented to our legislature in 1955 would have added
exclusive jurisdiction of adoptions and concurrent jurisdiction of
custody matters (habeas corpus proceedings). Another kind of
extension is to add jurisdiction over parents of juvenile offenders, 195
as might have been done in the new West Virginia statute imposing
civil liability on parents for vandalism of their children. 96 Another
possibility is to remove from the juvenile court statute the exception
for offenses which if committed by an adult would be punishable
c. 49, art. 6, § 4 (Michie 1955).
191 Note 184 supra, at 54.
192 Reinemann, Probation and the Juvenile Delinquent, 269 ANNAMs 109,
111 (1949),
reprinted in VEDDEn, THE JUVENIL OFFENDER 842, 344.
93
1 FiNE, 1,000,000 DELINQUENTs 278.
194 Chute, The Juvenile Court in Retrospect, Fed. Prob., Sept. 1949, p. 3,
reprinted in VEDDER, THE JuVENLE OFFENDER 233; Rubin, State Juvenile
Court: A New Standard, 30 Focus 103 (1951), reprinted in VEDDEa, THE
190W. VA. CODE

JUVENLE OFFENDER 810.

195 Smyth, The Juvenile Court and Delinquent Parents, Feb. Prob., Mar.
1949, p. 12, reprinted in VEDDER, THE JUVENILE OFFENDER 294.
196W. Va. Acts 1957, c. 1; W. VA. CoDE c. 55, art. 7A (Michie Supp.
1957).
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by death. 197 The mere act of homicide or rape' 98 does not transform
a juvenile into an adult; on the contrary such behavior merely shows
that the juvenile has serious emotional conflicts, or possibly a mental
illness or defect.
At least two juveniles have been indicted for murder in West
Virginia in recent years. One case involved a 15-year old boy in
Nicholas County who pleaded guilty and was sentenced to the state
penitentiary. 199 The other involved a 14-year old boy at Wheeling
who pleaded not guilty, presenting insanity as his defense.20 0 The
boy was sent to Weston State State Hospital for psychological and
psychiatric examinations. The psychological report said in part:
"This is an emotionally immature individual who deals
with situations in an apparently passive manner, lacking in
flexibility or alterations of behavior despite any circumstances.
Feelings of insecurity and rejection cause a trend toward inhibiting emotional response. There is dependency upon the mother
figure and antagonism toward the father. He is unable to
identify himself with others in a satisfactory manner and may
resort to overt behavior to compensate."
The psychiatric report said in part:
"It is our opinion that the subject, a constitutionally defective immature identical twin, was insane before, during and
after the commission of the confessed criminal act, and bereft
of reason, and as a result of this mental disorder or insane state
of mind, he was unable to know that the act was wrongful, nor
could he have refrained from so doing by reason of mental
defect. He is in need of further hospitalization....
"Did he know the nature and quality or character of the
particular act? Yes. He knew what instruments or weapons
to select to use, how to use them for the purpose unconsciously
demanded, but he did not know, could not know, how this
compelling and required satisfaction could be or would be
achieved; he was directed and controlled once the floodgates
of unconscious control were broken by a blind, unreasoning
19 W. VA. CODE c. 49 art 5 § 3 (Michie 1955). See Precker, The
Treatment of Juvenile Offenders in M~iurder Cases, 41 J. Cum. L., C. &P.S. 49
(1950), reprinted in VEDDER, THE JuvFN, .E OFFNDE 307.
198 See Mickens v. Commonwealth, 178 Va. 273, 16 S.E.2d 641, cert.

denied, 314 U.S. 690 (1942). The defendant was a 15-year old Negro convicted of and executed for rape of a white woman.
199 State ex rel. Hinkle v. Skeen, 138 W. Va. 116, 75 S.E.2d 227 (1953).
200 State v. Thomas Williams, not reported (Intermediate Court, Ohio
County, 1956). The discussion of this case is based on a letter from Judge
David A. McKee, dated Jan. 29, 1957, and enclosures, a letter from Dr. H.
Sinclair Tait dated Feb. 20, 1957, and letters from William Callahan, defense
counsel, dated Jan. 14 and Feb. 18 1957.
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fury, sadistic in nature, uncontrolled, and this urge, this internal energy, basically sexual and with no relationship to
time, had to be unconsciously satisfied, i.e., he was forced,
because of the aforementioned defect of reason and loss of any
defenses by the very nature of this urge or energy, to achieve
internal satisfaction, peace of mind, by means of killing. This
individual has still to work out his basic internal needs with
respect to his available resources, which are still defective and
inadequate, and he has not been restored to sanity:'
At the trial this state psychiatric report was permitted to be introduced only as defense testimony, while the prosecution presented strong evidence by prominent psychiatrists from Wheeling
and Pittsburgh that the defendant was sane and that his behavior
stemmed from character defect rather than a psychosis. (This illustrates the sort of battle of expert witnesses which psychiatrists object
to20 ' and which may be somewhat bewildering to the jury.) Instructions based on the McNaghten rule2 02 were given, and the
defendant was found guilty of first degree murder and sentenced
to the penitentiary at Moundsville.
The criticism of the McNaghten rules set out previously20 3
seems to apply especially in this case, since there was strong evidence of mental disorder. Moreover the jury may have felt that the
public desired a conviction,2 04 because of the shocking character
of the homicide (the victim was a 13-year old chum who was struck
with a brick, beaten with a board, and finally stabbed in the stomach). If the law had permitted the case to be tried by the juvenile
court,2 0 5 a medically oriented decision might have been acceptable
to the community; also the sensational publicity attendant upon the
trial could have been avoided.
In commenting upon the case Judge McKee expresses this view:
"In conclusion, may I suggest that it would well behoove
society to turn its attention and service to prevention by providing institutions where neglected children can be trained in
good character instead of finding mental defect to excuse
201 Gu
c
Nmm
D WEmoFEN, PsycmTRY AND ThE LAw e. 11;
DAVMDSON, FomaisIC PSYCHIATRY c. 22 (1952). Cf. the Continental system of

court-appointed expert medical witnesses, the Massachusetts law (text supra
at note 98), and current proposals of the American Bar Association for appointment of medical experts by the court from a panel selected by the local
medical
20 2 association. 'These plans tend to eliminate the battle of experts.
As declared in State v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 729, 15 S.E. 982 (1892).
203 See text at note 111 supra.
20 4
See text at note 146 supra.
205 See text at note 175 supra.
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wrongdoing. Of course, a subject whose animal instincts have
developed, who has no moral stamina or self-restraint is mentally subnormal, but this is character defect and not a mental
disease and must be remedied by character training. Fear of
consequence is, and always will be, the only deterrence from
wrongdoing for those of bad character and society must be
protected and we dare not put the welfare of one individual
ahead of public welfare. I call attention to the extent to which
free nations are going in spending money and training men to
inspire fear in the minds of aggressive nations and keep them
in restraint."20 6
In this connection it is significant that a treatment center for
emotionally disturbed children is being established at Charleston
to serve West Virginia, being located at the former Hillcrest home
for tubercular children.
Before leaving the subject of juvenile offenders and juvenile
courts we should consider the post-juvenile or young adult offenders.20 7 The youth authority developed in California and other jurisdictions may be regarded as an upward extension of the juvenile
court concept to include those a few years older. In West Virginia
the establishment of a forestry camp for boys in the 16-21 age
bracket is the first step in this direction.2 08 The American Law

Institute proposes as a part of its Model Penal Code a provision
permitting specialized correctional treatment for young adult offenders.2 0 9 In England the Borstal system for youthful offenders,
named for the town where the plan was first tried, has yielded
very good results. Essential to such programs are flexible administrative provisions in the governing statute and employment of competent personnel at the youth camps.
IX.

CONCLUSION

Space permits only brief mention of other topics, some of which
are equally as important as those developed here. In the field of
probation and parole, for instance, a very effective working relationship has been developed between the courts and social workers.
Although the first probation law was adopted by Massachusetts in
206
20 7

Letter to the author dated Jan. 29, 1957.

See generally BLOCH AND FLYNN, DELINQUENCY c. 16 (1956); TEEarns
AND REmv AmN, Tim CHALLENGE OF DELNQUENCY 354-71 (1950).
208 W. Va. Acts 1955, c. 16; W. VA. CODE c. 25, art. 4 (Michie 1955).

209 Tent. Draft No. 7 (1957). The appendices to this draft describe the
various youth authorities, especially that of California.
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1878, only three other states had followed suit by the time the first
federal law was enacted in 1925.210 In West Virginia the first effective probation and parole law was enacted in 1939; it provided for
a director of parole and a field staff to supervise parolees. 21 ' The
present parole system is hampered by lack of funds, hence the case
load of most parole officers is too large for them to do a first-rate job.
The three-man board of parole, successor to the director, now requires that parole officers have considerable training or experience
in social work.2 12 Probation, as distinguished from parole, has been
well developed in some counties of the state, but in others is scarcely
used at all. Thus when two similar crimes are committed in two
different counties, one defendant may get probation while the other
gets a sentence in the county jail or state penitentiary. Only 29 of
the 55 counties have regular probation officers (and some of these
are also employed as state parole officers); in the other counties
probationers are variously required to report to the sentencing
judge, the sheriff, a deputy sheriff, and even a lady court reporter.2 13
Probation ought to be further developed in all counties of the state
with well-trained probation officers in charge, in the interest of uniformity of administration of justice and better rehabilitation of
criminals.
In the area of domestic relations the attitudes of psychology
and social work are pressing hard on traditional legal ideas. It has
become widely recognized that counselling with family welfare
agencies will help prevent some divorces, and somewhat the same
technique is being tried by the courts themselves in Illinois and New
Jersey.2 14 Reconciliation is especially desirable where minor children are involved. Adoption is a field where there is sharp conflict
between the traditional legal viewpoint and that of the social worker.
The social worker is interested in placing the child in a home where
he not only will be loved and will be cared for financially, but
where in addition he will match the parents insofar as possible in
mental and physical characteristics, and above all, where the parents are emotionally mature people with a strong marital relationship. (As lawyers we are aware of those unfortunate children who
are placed in homes which are later disrupted by divorce or other
AND BELL, C nm, COURITS, AND PROBATION, intro. (1956).
211W. Va. Acts 1939, c. 27; W. VA. CODE c. 63, art. 12 (Michie 1955).
212 W. VA. PAmox. BOARD, SECOND ANNUAL REPORT 18-22 (1956).
213 Id. at 35-38.
214 Miner, An Illinois Innovation: The "Cooling-Off" Divorce Law, 42
A.B.A.J. 1131 (1956); N.Y. Times, June 80, 1957, § 1, p. 88, col. 1.
210 CHI
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marital -difficulties.) Placement by well-meaning doctors, lawyers,
or relatives is opposed by social workers as unfair to the child, in
that a home ill suited to the child may thwart the most desirable
development of his capacities. The revision of the child welfare
law proposed in 1955 would have limited the placement of children
to licensed children's agencies and the Department of Public Assistance itself. 215 A statute following this principle has been enacted
in California and is being advocated in many states.
For the torts of an insane person the traditional common-law
rule imposes strict liability regardless of the degree of insanity; this
is the overwhelming majority view in the United States today (the
civil law exonerates the insane tort-feasor). A recent article reviews
the cases and urges that the law be changed at least to correspond
to the McNaghten rule, so that a person who would be excused
from a clime because of insanity would also be excused from the
21 6
tort.
The problem of automobile accidents (the 1,000,000th highway
death in the United States was registered recently) is being considered fiom the viewpoint of psychology. "Studies of thousands
of accidents, made possible by the Allstate Grant for Driving Research at Iowa State College indicate that emotional disturbances
2 17
and improper attitudes of drivers are a major cause of accidents."
Perhaps the time is not distant when the privilege of driving a car
will be denied those whom tests show are emotionally immature or
prone to have accidents because of a neurosis.
Another situation germane to our subject is that where a will
or contract is challenged on the ground that the testator or promisor
was incompetent.2 18 A somewhat related problem is that of the
not quite incompetent beneficiary of a trust; in some states old age
alone is enough to justify appointment of a guardian, whereas in
others strong evidence of incompetency must be shown.2 1 9 And
suppose a person possessed of his faculties wishes to set up a trust
Draft of bill, c. 49, art. 4.
Ague, The Liability of Insane Persons in Tort Actions, 60 Dscx. L. REv.
211 (1956). Minnesota has gone farther and adopted a rule excusing the defendant merely upon proof that his tort was the product of mental illness. Supra
note 2150.
1
215

2 16

7ALLSTATE INs. Co., ARE You A MENTAL MENACE? (1956)

218

GuTrmcHRE

(leaflet).
14, also

AND WEmOFEN, PsYCHIATRY Am THE LAW c.

appears
2 19 in 36 Min. L. REv. 179 (1952).
McAvinchey, The Not-Quite-Incompetent Incompetent, 95 TRuSTs &
EsTATEs 872 (1956).
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which shall take effect only if he becomes totally incapable of managing his business affairs, as in the event of accident or serious illness? 22 0 The present law does not permit any such arrangement,

although it would seem a desirable reform in view of changing
conditions.
Some of the legal realists have proposed to re-examine the
whole judicial process in the light of psychology. Cardozo's classic
The Nature of the Judicial Process (1922) was perhaps the beginning of this study. The late Judge Jerome Frank was probably
the foremost writer in this field.22 1

For example, he wrote re-

cently that psychiatry and psychology might be useful in the trial
of cases in determining whether a witness erred in his original
observation, his subsequent memory of it, or his communication
of it in court.222 The case for psychology was boldly put by the

late Edward S. Robinson: "Every legal theory, insofar as it is more
than the statement of an arbitrary statute or rule of procedure, is
a theory about the human mind and human behavior... "223
Whether one approves or disapproves the growing interaction
between psychology (and related disciplines) and law, one must
recognize that this interaction is going on. It therefore behooves
lawyers and judges to learn more about psychology in order that
control and direct this movement
they may understand and thus
22 4
possible.
as
as intelligently

220 Wynn, A Vacuum in Our Law, 95 TRusTs & EsTATEs 879 (1956).
MiND (1930), and CoURTs ON TMAL
221 FnAAx, L.-w AN Tm MoDRN

(1949).

222 Frank, Judicial Fact-Finding and Psychology, 14 Omo ST. L.J. 183
(1953).
2
2 3 Lv w AND THE LAwYERS 50 (1935).
224
See the helpful suggestions for reading in Fay, The Practical Role of
Psychiatry in the Effective Practice of Law, 29 Ttmn. L.Q. 827 (1956).
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